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PROPERTY
I. PRIOR OWNER NOT ENTITLED TO REPURCHASE PROPERTY
ORIGINALLY CONDEMNED FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE BUT
SUBSEQUENTLY SOLD FOR PRIVATE USE
The South Carolina Supreme Court held in Indigo Realty
Co. v. City of Charleston1 that the lower court had exceeded its
equity powers by requiring the City of Charleston to reconvey
the Dumas Building to Indigo Realty after the city had aban-
doned its intended public use of the property. The court held
that a prior owner was not entitled to repurchase property
bought under a threat of condemnation by a municipal corpora-
tion that subsequently abandoned the property's public purpose
and transferred it to a developer for private use. Although the
South Carolina Supreme Court' had not previously addressed
the specific issue in this case, this holding is consistent with the
general rule of law that a fee simple title does not revert to the
prior owner when the use of the property changes.4
In September 1980 the Charleston City Council agreed to
widen Market Street to facilitate the development of Charleston
Center and authorized the city to take property necessary for
this purpose. The city notified Indigo Realty Company, Ltd.
that it intended to acquire the Dumas Building by purchase or
by condemnation to widen Market Street. On September 10,
1980, Indigo Realty agreed to convey the property to the city for
$149,500.00.' Six months later the city announced that it would
not widen Market Street;6 Indigo Realty then requested the city
to reconvey the property at the original purchase price. On June
9, 1981, the city council authorized the mayor to negotiate with
1. 281 S.C. 234, 314 S.E.2d 601 (1984).
2. Id. at 236, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
3. Record at 48.
4. See generally 26 AM. JuR. 2D Eminent Domain § 147 (1966); 3 J. SACKMAN, NICH-
OLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.36[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1984).
5. Record at 8. The city intended to institute eminent domain proceedings if a
purchase agreement were not reached. Id.
6. Record at 50. The city purportedly abandoned the widening of Market Street
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a private developer to exchange the Dumas Building for nearby
property. The Dumas Building was to be acquired by the devel-
oper for private use.7
Indigo Realty brought suit to enjoin the city from transfer-
ring the property to anyone except itself.8 The trial court
granted an injunction and ordered the city to reconvey the prop-
erty for the acquisition price. The court concluded that under
the circumstances, it was unfair to allow the city to convey the
property to anyone else.9 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed. 0
The supreme court based its decision primarily on the com-
mon-law rule that there is no reversion from a fee simple ac-
quired by purchase or by eminent domain.1 The court reasoned
that although Indigo Realty had no legal remedy, Indigo was
bound by this legal rule, which superseded the lower court's
"fashioning" an equitable remedy.12 While the court expressed
sympathy toward the respondent's plight, it repeated that it was
not willing to create an equitable right of repurchase. The court
stated that the decision to grant this right was for the
legislature.' 3
The supreme court emphasized that South Carolina contin-
ues to follow the common-law rule established in 1894 by Cham-
berlain v. Northeastern Railway Co. 14 The court implied that it
7. Id. at 50.
8. Id. at 50-51. The plaintiff alleged that "[i]t would be inequitable and unjust for
the Defendant... to take the... property... for a public purpose, under threat of
condemnation, and subsequently abandon the purpose for which the property was ac-
quired, and thereafter sell or trade [it] to private interests, .... without first giving the
plaintiff.., an opportunity to repurchase it." Id.
9. Id. at 59.
10. 281 S.C. at 237, 314 S.E.2d at 602.
11. Id. at 236, 314 S.E.2d at 602. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 237, 314 S.E.2d at 603. In a footnote the court cited a Minnesota statute
requiring the State Highway Department to offer land first to the previous owner or his
surviving spouse when it no longer needs the land for highway purposes. Id. n.1 (citing
MINN. STAT. § 161.44 (1982 & Supp. 1983)).
14. 41 S.C. 399, 19 S.E. 743 (1894). In Chamberlain the court held that when the
railroad company abandoned its intended use of land purchased for public use, the fee
simple title did not revert to the original owner. Id. at 405-06, 19 S.E. at 745. By relying
on Chamberlain, the court suggested that the length of time the property is held before
abandoning the public use is unimportant. In Chamberlain the railroad company held
the property for forty years before abandoning the public use. In Indigo, however, the
city abandoned the public use of the property after holding it for six months. The court
2
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was following a long line of South Carolina cases that stated the
proposition that there is no reversion of a fee simple title after
abandonment of its public use. Chamberlain seems to be the
only case, however, that supports this common-law rule.15
The court briefly acknowledged respondent's reliance on
Karesh v. City Council of Charleston,6 which held that the City
of Charleston could not condemn property for the purpose of
leasing it to a private corporation to construct a convention
center and parking garage because the public benefit was not
sufficient.1  The Indigo court noted that the public benefit in
Karesh was questionable, while the proposed public use of Mar-
ket Street would have constituted a clear public benefit.' The
court, however, ignored the fact that the original public purpose
for taking the Dumas Building was not in dispute.'9 Karesh
could have been distinguished on the basis that in that case the
city intended to condemn or purchase the property for its imme-
diate sale to a private real estate crporation, thereby displacing
private property owners for predominantly private purposes.2 °
While Chamberlain is the only South Carolina case that di-
rectly supports the court's holding in Indigo, most other juris-
dictions also hold that property acquired in fee simple by
purchase or eminent domain does not revert to the prior owner
upon abandonment of its original use.21 While the law may be
recognized this distinction, but did not discuss it in the opinion. 281 S.C. at 236, 314
S.E.2d at 602.
15. The court also cited with approval Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial
Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 986 (1971), which
stated that the validity of title was determined when the property was taken and that
the later abandonment of the original purpose did not invalidate the condemnation. Un-
like Indigo, however, Timmons concerned a change from one public use to another,
which had been anticipated before the city took the property.
16. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
17. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 344. Respondent argued that if the city was allowed to
transfer the Dumas Building to a private developer before giving Indigo Realty the op-
portunity to repurchase it, the city would circumvent the legal rule in Karesh. Brief of
Respondent at 7.
18. 281 S.C. at 237, 314 S.E.2d at 602-03.
19. Record at 9.
20. 271 S.C. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
21. See, e.g., Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Harbond, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Shoemaker v Dep't of Transp., 240 Ga. 573, 241 S.E.2d 820 (1978); City of
Cardweli v. Roark, 98 Idaho 897, 575 P.2d 495 (1978); Bottillo v. State, 53 A.D.2d 975,
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clear on the question of a reversionary interest in a fee simple,
respondent did not claim a reversionary interest at all. Instead
respondent sought the equitable right to be the first to repur-
chase the property. 22 The trial court found that it could appro-
priately exercise jurisdiction in equity since there was a "com-
plete absence of any legal remedy" available to Indigo.2 In
finding that it was unfair for the city not to reconvey the prop-
erty to Indigo Realty, the trial court focused primarily on the
short period of time between the taking and contemplated
change of use.24
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the remedy
granted by the trial court without explaining why the court had
exceeded its equity powers. Possibly the record did not present
sufficient facts to balance the equities and hardships in favor of
Indigo Realty. 25 If the record had indicated more than the aban-
donment of public purpose after six months and had shown a
conclusive picture of inequitable conduct by the city, the court
might have upheld the lower court's decision. The stipulated
facts and pleadings, however, revealed no specific evidence of ar-
bitrary, bad faith dealings on the part of the city.
26
The court stated that this particular controversy would be
best remedied by the legislature,2 7 rather than through the eq-
22. Brief of Respondent at 4. Since the city acquired a fee simple title in the prop-
erty and paid monetary consideration for it, the city had legal title and Indigo Realty
could not have contested the validity of the transaction between the city and the subse-
quent party. Because Indigo Realty conveyed an unconditional fee simple title, it did not
have an adequate legal remedy and had to seek an equitable remedy. Indigo Realty
could, however, have pleaded breach of an implied condition of public use to invoke a
legal remedy. Discontinuance of use of a conditional fee, however, depends on the partic-
ular case, and this interest must be expressly intended by the parties. See 3 J. SACKMAN,
supra note 4, § 9.36[2]. There is no evidence of an express intent by the parties that the
conveyance was a conditional fee. Record at 8-9.
23. Record at 51.
24. Id. at 51-52. See supra note 14.
25. In fashioning an equitable remedy, courts consider the facts and circumstances
of the controversy to balance the equities and hardships of both parties. Some determi-
native considerations are good faith, change in circumstances, unconscionability, fraud,
and duress. See D. DOSs, HAND3OOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 52-54 (1973). Courts are
generally not precluded from creating a remedy as long as it does not violate the law. See
generally 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 103 (1966).
26. Record at 3-9.
27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. MINN. STAT. § 161.44 addresses recon-
veyance when the remainder of the tract taken is still owned by the condemnee or sur-
viving spouse. In First Am. Nat'l Bank v. State, 322 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn. 1982),
[Vol. 37
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uity powers of courts. It is questionable whether legislative ac-
tion on so rare a situation is practical. Since the common law
clearly states that the city has the right to convey a fee simple
acquired by purchase or eminent domain, the legislature would
be faced with the necessity of providing arbitrary guidelines for
very specific situations that involve such factors as the time be-
tween the taking and subsequent sale, the motives of the munic-
ipality, financial considerations, the motives of the repurchaser,
and public interests. These factors are more appropriate for con-
sideration by a court of equity on a case by case basis than by a
general law-making body. The court's objection to the creation
of a remedy is not consistent with the general rule that "[c]ourts
have the inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to
insure that just results are reached to the fullest extent
possible.
' '21
The court's holding in Indigo sets a broad precedent based
on facts peculiar to a single situation. The decision is a potential
invitation to municipalities to take property with the sole intent
of selling it and making a profit. In such a situation, a plaintiff
in the position of Indigo Realty could plead, under the doctrine
of restitution, that the municipality has been unjustly enriched
by the subsequent sale and plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the
difference between the purchase price and sale price of the prop-
erty. 9 When a municipality initially threatens condemnation,
the attorney for the private property owner may wish to con-
sider negotiating the conveyance of a conditional
fee-conditional upon the use of the property for a public pur-
pose-to prevent abuse of the taking power.
Emily E. Garrard
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the policy of the statute was to prevent con-
demning more land than was needed for public use.
28. Ex Parte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 595, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983).
29. Restitution is a remedy that grants to the plaintiff profits that it would be un-
just for the defendant to keep. A plaintiff may be entitled to specific restitution of real
property if he can establish legal title. Since Indigo Realty did not have legal title, sub-
stitutionary restitution, such as monetary consideration, would have been a more appro-
priate remedy. Courts decide the form of restitution by examining the particular case to




Published by Scholar Commons, 1985
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
II. SCOPE OF WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY LIMITED
Two important decisions concerning liability for construc-
tion defects in the sale of real estate were issued by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Roundtree Villas Association v. 4701
Kings Corp.30 and the South Carolina Court of Appeals in
Holder v. Haskett3 1 Both cases refused to extend liability under
the implied warranty of habitability, established in Lane v.
Trenholm,3 2 to parties other than the builder-vendor. Roundtree
Villas held that a lending institution could not be held liable for
negligent construction in the sale of real estate, but that a com-
mon-law duty of due care did arise when the lender undertook
to repair defects. South Carolina joins the majority of jurisdic-
tions that have considered the issue in refusing to extend liabil-
ity for defects to a lending institution.3 3 Holder held that the
realtor and developer were not liable under an implied warranty
of habitability since neither was a vendor of the real estate. Ag-
grieved purchasers now have fewer deep pockets from which to
recover for defects in new buildings.
Roundtree Villas arose from a complex set of facts. The
plaintiff, Roundtree Villas Association (the Regime), owned and
administered the common elements of the condominium project
Roundtree Villas. In 1973 Republic Mortgage Investment Ser-
vices lent funds to Roundtree Corporation to construct thirty-
seven condominium units. Republic monitored the project, re-
quired the builder to employ an engineer to inspect it and sub-
mit certifications, and sent agents to inspect the premises.
Roundtree, unable to sell many of the units after completion,
deeded the remaining units to 4701 Kings Corporation, which
had been incorporated by Republic to facilitate sale and prevent
30. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
31. 283 S.C. 247, 321 S.E.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1984).
32. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
33. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3D 247 (1971). Only one case thus far has held the lender
liable. In Conner v. Great Western Sav. and Loan Assoc., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), the court held that the lender had breached a duty arising from
the lender's extra activities. California has now codified this holding at CAL. CiV. CODE
ANN. § 3434 (West 1970).
208 [Vol. 37
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foreclosure. At this time Republic became aware of structural
defects in the roofs and in order to pacify current owners and
promote sales, employed various companies to repair the roofs,
balconies, and other items. When Republic refused to replace
the roofs, despite an expert's recommendation, the Regime
brought an action against Republic and its advisor, builder, ar-
chitect, contractors, and seller for negligent construction, negli-
gent repairs, and breach of implied and express warranties.
The South Carolina Supreme Court first determined that
the Regime had standing only to sue for damage to the common
elements that it owned, limiting the Regime to recovery for the
defective roofs.34 The court found, however, that Republic's in-
volvement as a mere lender was insufficient to render it liable
for the negligence of the builder, architect, or contractors. The
builder, the court reasoned, has no duty to protect the lender,
and the lender has no duty to protect the builder.35 The court
went on to find, however, that Republic assumed a common-law
duty of due care when it undertook to repair the defects.3
Roundtree Villas presented an issue of first impression in
South Carolina. Although the court adopted the majority view in
refusing to extend liability for negligent construction to a lend-
ing institution, it failed to recognize the possibility that under
certain circumstances the lender should be held liable. Relying
on Butts v. Atlanta Federal Savings & Loan,3" the court stated
34. As a rule, only the individual owners of condominiums, not condominium as-
sociations, have standing to sue for defects in the individual condominium units. If the
claim relates to common elements or other items owned by the Regime, it may bring the
action. See Summerhouse Condo Assoc. v. Majestic Sav. and Loan Assoc., 44 Colo. App.
495, 615 P.2d 71 (1980); Imperial Towers Condo v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. App.
1976). S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-29(2)(1976) defines common elements as "the foundations,
main walls, roofs, halls, lobbies, stairways, and entrance and exit or communication ways
35. 282 S.C. at 422, 321 S.E.2d at 50.
36. The court cited the Second Restatement of Torts, which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
ing, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1974).
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that an action based on an implied contract does not lie against
a lender that makes inspections because the inspections are not
made for the benefit of the buyers. Yet if the purpose of the
inspections and monitoring is to protect the lender's interest,
this conduct places the lender in a position to control the
builder and ensure adequate standards of construction.38 The
court failed to address the policy question of who reasonably
should shoulder the financial burden of ensuring adequate work-
manship in construction. Although lending institutions do not
have specialized technical competence to act as builders, they
could properly be assigned the same legal responsibility as a
builder if they undertake activities beyond mere inspection. Ul-
timately, however, the court reached the proper decision in
Roundtree Villas, since Republic was not engaged in any ex-
traordinary activities.
In Holder the purchasers sought to hold the realtor and de-
veloper accountable for construction defects. The Holders
wished to purchase a house in Huntington Estates, a subdivision
owned and developed by Huntington Developers. Haskett Re-
alty advised the Holders to purchase a vacant lot in the develop-
ment and obtain an $800 discount by contracting with Willard
Sellers to build their house. After Willard Sellers abandoned
construction and left town, the Holders discovered serious con-
struction defects. They then sued the realtor, developer, and
Ray Haskett, Jr., for breach of implied warranty, alleging that
the sale was a "package deal" in which each had participated.
The court of appeals reasoned that because neither Haskett
nor the developer had received any part of the purchase price or
entered into any sales contract, they were not vendors and, thus,
could not be held liable for construction defects. The court also
found that Haskett Realty, although it had acted as agent for
Willard Sellers in arranging the package deal, was not a party to
the contract and, therefore, was not liable as a vendor.
Although the decision in Holder is technically correct, the
court of appeals may have read Lane v. Trenholm too narrowly.
The Lane court adopted the doctrine of caveat venditor and
"the just philosophy that a sound price warrants a sound com-
38. For an excellent discussion advocating the extension of liability for construction
defects to lending institutions, see Note, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Struc-
tural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 739 (1968).
210 [Vol. 37
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modity. '' 39 It was not the mere existence of a contract that lead
the Lane court to hold the developer liable, but also the fact
that the developer had placed the house in the stream of com-
merce and exacted a price from the buyers. As the Lane court
observed: "[The builder's] liability is not founded upon fault,
but because it has profited by receiving a fair price and, as be-
tween it and an innocent purchaser, the innocent purchaser
should be protected from latent defects. '40 The Holders paid a
sound price for their house. Although strictly speaking, it was
the builder, Willard Sellers, who placed the house in the stream
of commerce and entered the construction contract, the realtor
at least, as the court of appeals admitted, received a commission
based on the price paid by the Holders.
Roundtree Villas and Holder both restrict liability under
Lane to builder-vendors, specifically absolving lending institu-
tions and other parties that do not enter the construction con-
tract with the purchaser. Although recognition of the implied
warranty of habitability in Lane placed South Carolina in the
vanguard of states in protecting real estate purchasers, the
courts in Roundtree Villas and Holder were perhaps wise to
limit this protection. Even though this state has consistently re-
jected caveat emptor, future purchasers of new buildings and
homes should be aware that the implied warranty of habitability
is not a limitless doctrine and that purchasers will not always be
able to avoid bearing the cost of construction defects.
Michelle D. Brodie
III. HOMEOWNERS GRANTED RECOURSE AGAINST HOMEBUILDERS'
BONDS
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held in Watson v.
Harmon41 that members of the public may maintain an action
on a statutory bond submitted by a residential homebuilder
even though the statute requiring the bond does not expressly
grant a private cause of action. The court concluded that the
legislative intent of this statute was to protect the individual
39. 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
40. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.




Published by Scholar Commons, 1985
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvmw
homeowner rather than to provide recourse to the licensing
agency, the Residential Homebuilders Commission, for possible
penalties.
In this dispute the homeowners, Julian and Barbara Wat-
son, brought separate actions against Stuart Harmon, a
homebuilder, and the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,
Harmon's surety. The Watsons filed an action against Mr. Har-
mon for breach of contract and negligent failure to replace their
roof promptly as contracted.42 This alleged negligence resulted
in rain damage to the homeowners' residence and personal prop-
erty. The Watsons knew Harmon was licensed by the South Car-
olina Residential Home Builders Commission and were also in-
formed by Mr. Harmon that he was bonded. Believing they were
protected by the bond, the homeowners filed another action
against the surety for damages caused by the homebuilder." The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Aetna on the
ground that the Watsons had no right to sue the surety because
they were neither named obligees on the bond nor given the
right by applicable statutes and regulations.44
The court of appeals rejected the lower court's implication
that the bond was for the protection of the Commission rather
than of the public.45 The court of appeals held this interpreta-
tion invalid upon an examination of the applicable statute46 and
regulations47 that required the bond. The court stated that when
42. Id. at 216, 312 S.E.2d at 9-10.
43. Id. at 216-17, 312 S.E.2d at 10.
44. Id. at 217, 312 S.E.2d at 10.
45. Id.
46. The applicable statute provides in pertinent part:
All residential home builders shall be required to be licensed by the Com-
mission annually under the provisions of this Chapter . . . after paying the
required annual fee by submitting to the Commission . . . the following:
(b) An executed bond with a surety approved by the Commission in the sum of
ten thousand dollars, as proof of financial responsibility acceptable to the
Commission.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-59-70 (1976).
47. The applicable regulation provides in pertinent part:
All Residential Home Builders desiring to be licensed in the State of
South Carolina shall make and file with the Commission ... a written applica-
tion.., to be supported by a financial statement, dated within sixty (60) days
of date of application, showing net worth of $50,000 or more, or an executed
bond with surety approved by the Commission in the sum of $10,000 . . ..
S.C. Residential Home Builders Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 106-4 (1976).
[Vol. 37
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a bond is given to satisfy a statutory requirement, "the bond is
construed with reference to the statute and the intent of the
statute will govern."48 The court concluded that the purpose of
requiring either a bond or proof of financial responsibility was
"to protect the home-buying public from ... financially irre-
sponsible builders. 4 9 The court reasoned that the provision for
an alternative to the bond requirement - a showing of net
worth - indicated a legislative intent to afford persons injured
by a builder a financially solvent avenue of recourse.50
To support its determination of the legislative intent of this
statute, the court cited Hutto v. American Fire and Casualty
Ins. Co.51 In Hutto a Columbia city ordinance required that taxi-
cabs be licensed and that taxicab operators file an indemnity
bond or liability insurance policy as a condition of obtaining this
license. 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded in
Hutto that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect the pub-
lic against unsound businesses and that this purpose must be
incorporated into the insurance policy.
53
The court of appeals distinguished Rogers v. U.S. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co." from the case at hand. In Rogers the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that an automobile dealer's licens-
ing bond was not intended to benefit third parties, but rather to
protect the South Carolina Highway Department.5 5 The court of
appeals determined that the statutory language and conditions
of the bonds required were dissimilar and Rogers was not con-
trolling in the Watson case.5 The court observed that the home
48. 280 S.C. at 217, 312 S.E.2d at 10.
49. Id. at 218, 312 S.E.2d at 11 (quoting Henderson v. Evans, 268 S.C. 127, 136, 232
S.E.2d 331, 335 (1977)(Gregory, J., dissenting)).
50. 280 S.C. at 218, 312 S.E.2d at 11.
51. 215 S.C. 90, 54 S.E.2d 523 (1949).
52. Id. at 94, 54 S.E.2d at 525.
53. Id. at 97-98, 54 S.E.2d at 527.
54. 225 S.C. 298, 81 S.E.2d 896 (1954).
55. Id. at 301-02, 81 S.E.2d at 897.
56. 280 S.C. at 220-21, 312 S.E.2d at 12. The court of appeals used three criteria,
established by the supreme court in Rogers, to distinguish Watson. First, the court in
Rogers held that the $25 bond required for automobile dealers evidenced an intent by
the legislature not to provide security for a wrong to a member of the public. 225 S.C. at
301, 81 S.E.2d at 896. The court of appeals in Watson noted that contrary to the statu-
tory bond in Rogers, the home builder's requirement clearly manifested a legislative in-
tention to protect the public. 280 S.C. at 221, 312 S.E.2d at 12.
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builders' bond "serves no purpose at all if it is not to pay indi-
viduals who cannot recover from the builder because he has no
assets.
5 7
The court of appeals further noted that the only financial
sanction that the Commission could impose against the
homebuilder is a fine of one-hundred dollars or a prison sen-
tence of thirty days." Furthermore, this penalty can be imposed
only when a builder presents false information in its application
for a license.50 The court determined that this minimal sanction
could not possibly require a $10,000 bond or proof of a net worth
of $50,000 to protect the Commissioner's interest.10
After determining the purpose of the statute, the court con-
cluded that "absent clear language to the contrary," an action
may be maintained against the bond.61 The court of appeals
noted that in Graybar Electric Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem-
nity Co.6 2 and Anchor Casualty Co. v. Commissioner of Secur-
ity, 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the pur-
pose of a statutory bond requirement was to afford a right of
action on the bonds." The Minnesota Supreme Court held in
Anchor that when an occupational group is licensed and a bond
is required as part of the legislative scheme to protect the pub-
the legislature had expressly stated its intent to protect the public in S.C. CoDE ANN. §§
8-3-220 (public officials), 25-5-20 (highway patrolmen), 40-39-50 (pawn brokers), while
no similar intent had been expressed in the automobile dealer licensing bond statute. 225
S.C. at 221, 81 S.E.2d at 897. The court of appeals in Watson distinguished these stat-
utes on the grounds that the first two bonds (for public officials and highway patrolmen)
are conditioned on faithful performance and are not licensing bonds, and the third bond
(for pawn brokers) is based on good character and not on any statutory standard of
competence. 280 S.C. at 221, 312 S.E,2d at 12.
Finally, the court in Rogers noted that the condition of the automobile dealer bond
required "the lawful operation" of the dealer's business; the court interpreted this condi-
tion as "simply referr[ing to the requirements of the statute, the keeping of records,
etc." 225 S.C. at 302, 81 S.E.2d at 897. The court in Watson held that the residential
homebuilders bond statute does not specify the condition of the bond; rather it is an
alternative to proof of financial responsibility. 280 S.C. at 221, 312 S.E.2d at 12.
57. 280 S.C. at 222, 312 S.E.2d at 13.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-59-130 (1976); S.C. Residential Home Builders Comm'n R.,
S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 106-9 (1976).
59. Id.
60. 280 S.C. at 222, 312 S.E.2d at 13.
61. Id.
62. 208 Minn. 478, 294 N.W. 654 (1940).
63. 259 Minn. 277, 107 N.W.2d 234 (1961).
64. 280 S.C. at 223, 312 S.E.2d at 13-14.
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lic, the bond may be enforced by one claiming injury from mis-
conduct of the licensee. 5
The court of appeals also considered the bond itself and
concluded that Aetna was obligated under the language of the
bond because it failed to abide by Commission rules.6 The court
further noted that since Harmon's alleged misconduct was the
type that is proscribed by Commission regulations,67 the Wat-
sons had the right to recover on Harmon's bond."'
The court of appeals' decision in Watson v. Harmon pro-
vides the individual homeowner a recourse against the statutory
bond provided by the residential home builder, without an ex-
press statutory grant of a private cause of action. The court ar-
rived at this conclusion through an interpretation of the legisla-
tive intent of the licensing statute and regulation and a
comparison of other similar statutory bond requirements.
Laura S. Campbell
IV. DISCHARGE FROM ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE DOES NOT
ALWAYS TERMINATE A POWER OF SALE
In McConnell v. Smith 9 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that the issuance of letters dismissory did not termi-
nate a testamentary power of sale that is in the nature of a trust.
Since the power of sale was connected with the use and enjoy-
ment of the estate, it extended beyond the duties of administra-
tion. Thus, the executrix had full power under the will to sell
and convey the disputed land, even after being discharged from
administration of the estate. In reaching this decision, the court
joined other jurisdictions that follow the general rule.
7 0
Lewis and Ruby McConnell brought this action to confirm
65. 259 Minn. at 278, 107 N.W.2d at 236 (citing Graybar, 208 Minn. 478, 294 N.W.
654).
66. 280 S.C. at 224, 312 S.E.2d at 14.
67. S.C. Residential Home Builders Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 106-7
(1976) requires that as a condition for obtaining a license, a home builder not be grossly
negligent or incompetent or engage in any misconduct in the building of homes. See also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-59-90 (1097).
68. 280 S.C. at 224, 312 S.E.2d at 14.
69. 280 S.C. 393, 313 S.E.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1984).
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their title to real property purchased from Ruby Smith. On No-
vember 8, 1960, Lawrence Smith died testate, holding title to
the property. His will devised all his property to his wife and
son, Ruby and Tony Smith. The will also appointed Ruby Smith
as executrix with a power of sale.7 1 On October 29, 1963, more
than a year after she was discharged from administration of the
estate by letters dismissory, Ruby Smith conveyed the property
to the McConnells.
When the McConnells sought to confirm their title, Tony
Smith, decedent's son, counterclaimed for a declaration of his
undivided one-half interest. The lower court granted judgment
on the counterclaim, apparently concerned that the son was a
minor at the time of the sale and that the property was sold
without court approval.
7 2
The court of appeals determined that the son's interest was
subject to the power of sale and could be divested by a valid
exercise of that power. Since the intent of the testator was to
grant a power of sale in the nature of a trust personal to the
wife, her power of sale was not terminated by the letters dismis-
sory. Therefore, the sale of the property was a valid exercise of
the power granted Ruby Smith.
The court reasoned that a will that confers a power of sale,
with discretion to sell or not, confers a power that is personal
and independent of the role of the donee as executrix.7 3 In de-
termining whether the will conferred a power of sale, the court
found that the intent of the grantor was controlling.74 Several
features of the will evinced an intent to permit the wife to use
and enjoy the estate during her life. This intent, the court rea-
71. The clause appointing Ruby Smith stated:
I nominate and appoint my wife, RUBY HEAD BROOKS SMITH, as Execu-
tric [sic] of this my last will and testament, and give her full power to sell and
convey at public or private the [sic] sale of [sic] part or all of my property as
she in her judgment deems best, she it [sic] to invest and reinvest the proceeds
of such sale during her lifetime and widowhood, and at her death it is to al go
to my son, TONY AUGUSTUS SMITH, to have and to hold until [sic] he
becomes as [sic] of age.
280 S.C. at 395, 313 S.E.2d at 36 (footnote omitted).
72. Brief of Respondent at 7.
73. 280 S.C. at 396, 313 S.E.2d at 36. In support of this rule, the court cited Rawl-
ings v. Rawlings, 332 Mo. 503, 58 S.W.2d 735 (1933); Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81
S.W. 1151 (1904).
74. 280 S.C. at 396, 313 S.E.2d at 36.
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soned, extended the power of sale beyond the term of her
administration.
The cases that have explored the issue of whether a power
of sale survives the discharge from administration of an estate
have turned on the intent of the testator in granting the power.7'
If the testator's intent is to confer a power of sale with discre-
tion to sell or not, then the power of sale survives the dis-
charge. If the testator's intent is to direct the executor to sell,
the power is in aid of administration, and the executor cannot
sell after discharge.
7 7
Since the testator's intent is the overriding consideration, it
is appropriate to allow the power of sale to survive discharge
where the intent is to provide for the executrix and others. If,
however, the testator directs the sale merely out of concern for
settling the estate, then it is only reasonable that the power of
sale terminate when the executrix is discharged.
McConnell v. Smith provides a lesson to parties purchasing
property from an estate. If the seller's administration of the es-
tate has been terminated, it is possible that the power to sell
may have expired with the discharge. If so, the buyer may be
acquiring an encumbered title, since executors cannot sell unfet-
tered title to real property when their power to sell is mandatory
and, therefore, must be exercised before their administration
terminates.
Michelle D. Brodie
V. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN MAY INHERIT FROM THEIR FATHERS'
ESTATES
Until recently, section 21-3-30 of the South Carolina Code"'
75. See, e.g., Doub v. Harper, 234 N.C. 14, 65 S.E.2d 309 (1951).
76. Davis v. Lambert, 203 Ala. 277, 82 So. 529 (1919). Cf. Starr v. Willoughby, 218
Ill. 485, 75 N.E. 1029 (1905). In Starr the will contained a mandatory direction to sell,
but the power had not been executed at the time of discharge. The court affirmed the
beneficiaries' power to sell the property.
77. Boland v. Tiernay, 118 Iowa 59, 91 N.W. 836 (1902).
78. S.C. CODE: ANN. § 21-3-30 (1976)(amended 1985). This section provided in perti-
nent part: "Any illegitimate child or children whose mother shall die intestate possessed
of any real or personal property shall be, so far as such property is concerned, an heir or
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permitted an illegitimate child to inherit property from the
mother, but not the father. In Wilson v. Jones9 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that this provision violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.s" This holding is consistent with the trend
in other jurisdictions.81 The court further held that an illegiti-
mate child could inherit property from the father only if the fa-
ther died after April 26, 1977.82 After the Wilson decision the
South Carolina General Assembly amended section 21-3-30 to
permit illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers and to
establish guidelines for determining paternity.8 3
The court based its holding that Section 21-3-30 was uncon-
stitutional on Trimble v. Gorden.8 4 In Trimble the United States
Supreme Court held that a comparable provision of the Illinois
Probate Act Code violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.8 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, declined to apply Trimble retroactively. The court rea-
soned that property rights of inheritance are vested upon a dece-
dent's death, and, thus, statutes in effect at the date of death
govern the disposition of an estate, even if subsequent modifying
statutes are enacted.88 The court further reasoned that the state
had no power to modify vested property rights.8 7 The court con-
79. 281 S.C. 230, 314 S.E.2d 341 (1984).
80. Id. at 232, 314 S.E.2d at 342-43. The equal protection clause provides that a
state shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. See, e.g., Lucas v. Handcock, 266 Ark. 142, 583 S.W.2d 491 (1979); Pendleton v.
Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977); Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980);
Estate of Dulles, 494 Pa. 180, 431 A.2d 208 (1981); Lovejoy v. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
82. 281 S.C. at 233, 314 S.E.2d at 343.
83. The amended statute provides in pertinent part:
Any illegitimate child whose father dies intestate possessed of any real or
personal property is an heir-at-law if paternity has been established by order
or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction during the lifetime of the father
or the father has signed an instrument acknowledging the child as his.
1985 S.C. Acts 155.
84. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
85. Id. at 776.
86. 281 S.C. at 230, 314 S.E.2d at 343 (citing Muldrow v. Caldwell, 173 S.C. 243,
250-51, 175 S.E. 501, 504 (1934)(1934 statute allowing illegitimate and legitimate chil-
dren to inherit from illegitimate relatives did not apply to the estate of an intestate who
died in 1931)).
87. 281 S.C. at 230, 314 S.E.2d at 343 (citing Schumacher v. Chapin, 228 S.C. 77, 87-
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cluded, therefore, that illegitimate children whose fathers died
after April 26, 1977, the date Trimble was decided, may inherit
from their fathers' estates. 88
In response to the Jones decision, the South Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly passed an amended version of section 21-3-30 that
took effect on June 20, 1985. The amended statute permits ille-
gitimate children to inherit from their fathers if either (1) pater-
nity was established by court order or decree during the life of
the father or (2) the father signed an instrument acknowledging
paternity.8 9
The Trimble court did not specify the circumstances under
which illegitimate children could inherit from their intestate fa-
thers, but did approve the establishment of paternity through
child support actions, prior adjudications, and formal acknowl-
edgements. The court further stated that it would uphold a stat-
ute that provides specific but not burdensome methods of estab-
lishing paternity.90 It appears, therefore, that the current South
Carolina statute would satisfy the requirements of due process. 1
It should be noted that South Carolina law regarding the
88, 88 S.E.2d 874, 879 (1955)(1952 statute governing legitimacy of a child in a void mar-
riage did not permit divesting rights of an heir whose father died before the statute was
approved)).
88. 281 S.C. at 230, 314 S.E.2d at 343 (citing Frakes v. Hunt, 266 Ark. 171, 174, 583
S.W.2d 497, 499 (1979)(Trimble should be applied only prospectively "[t]o prevent cha-
otic conditions arising from the lack of title to real property"); Pendleton v. Pendleton,
560 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Ky. 1977)(Trimble would not apply retroactively unless the same
constitutional issue was already in litigation)).
89. See supra note 83.
90. 430 U.S. at 772. For a detailed discussion of Trimble, see Property, Annual Sur-
vey of South Carolina Law, 30 S.C.L. Rev. 143, 143 (1979).
91. Cf. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)(upholding constitutionality of a New York
statute requiring a court order of filiation during the father's lifetime for his illegitimate
child to inherit his property); Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762
(1979)(upholding constitutionality of statute requiring that paternity be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil action brought during the father's lifetime, by
a written acknowledgement of paternity by the father during his lifetime, or by the mar-
riage of the father to the illegitimate's mother after the birth of the child). The Lalli
court distinguished Trimble by stating that the goal of encouraging legitimate family
relationships through the Illinois statutory requirement that the parents of an illegiti-
mate child must marry was not the intent of the New York law. 439 U.S. at 267-68. The
court found the New.York statute constitutional because it did not deny inheritance
rights to an unnecessarily large number of children as the Illinois statute in Trimble had.
Id. at 273. The Mitchell court held that unlike the Ilinois statute in Trimble, the North
Carolina statutes did not discriminate against illegitimates since alternate methods of
proving paternity were provided.
17
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inheritance rights of illegitimates will change if the General As-
sembly passes the proposed South Carolina Probate Code
(SCPC). Section 2-109 of the SCPC permits inheritance by an
illegitimate if (1) the father marries the illegitimate's mother ei-
ther before or after the child's birth or (2) a court determines
paternity either before or after the father's death."2 The pro-
posed SCPC does not resolve other questions raised, but not an-
swered, by Wilson. Unsettled problems remain regarding the
Bastardy Act, which provides in part that a person may not
leave more than one-fourth of his estate to his illegitimate child
if he has living legitimate children.9 3 The constitutionality of
this act is highly questionable in light of Trimble and Wilson.94
In the Reporter's Comments to the proposed section 2-109, it is
suggested that the Bastardy Act be repealed.9 5
The practitioner must keep in mind that the law affecting
property rights of illegitimate children is still evolving, especially
in light of the possible passage of the SCPC. The practitioner
also should be aware that because of changing attitudes toward
marriage and family life, this area of the law may have an in-
creasing effect on clients. Therefore, the practitioner must keep
abreast of changes in the law and advise his clients accordingly.
In drafting wills, it is especially important that the practitioner
encourage clients to disclose all relevant information regarding
their children in order to avoid possible inheritance problems.
Emily E. Garrard
92. S.C. Probate Code § 2-109(2)(Proposed Official Draft 1984). See also Uniform
Probate Code § 2-109(2), 8 U.L.A. 66 (1975). Section 2-109(2) also addresses the issue of
the father's support and open acknowledgement of the child as an element of paternity.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-7-480, 27-33-100 (1976).
94. For a comprehensive discussion of the Bastardy Act after Trimble, see Property,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 30 S.C.L. REv. 143, 143 (1979).
95. S.C. Probate Code § 2-109(2) commentary at 52 (Proposed Official Draft 1984).
The comments also suggest that the beneficiary provision of S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-51-20
and 15-51-30 (1976)(S.C. Wrongful Death Act) be amended so that illegitimates are
treated in the same manner as in section 2-109(2).
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VI. "RE-EMERGENCE DOCTRINE" GOVERNS OWNERSHIP OF LAND
FORMED BY ACCRETION
In Horry County v. Woodward98 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals adopted the so-called "re-emergence doctrine."
Courts have applied this doctrine when two tracts of land, one
riparian and the other nonriparian, are separated by a fixed
boundary line. If the riparian tract is lost through erosion, so
that the nonriparian tract becomes riparian, and subsequent ac-
cretion rebuilds land over the original riparian tract, the rebuilt
land, under the "re-emergence doctrine," becomes the property
of the titleholder of the original riparian tract.9 7 In adopting this
doctrine, the court expressly rejected the rule announced in
Welles v. Bailey that the owner of the original riparian land
not only holds title to any accretions within the boundaries of
the former nonriparian tract, but also to any accretions beyond
those boundaries. The Welles court reasoned that once the origi-
nal riparian tract has completely eroded, it cannot be rebuilt be-
cause "all original lines submerged by the river have ceased to
exist."99
This case concerned a title dispute over a portion of Bird
Island located within the South Carolina border. Price held title
to the portion of the island located in North Carolina and
claimed title to the South Carolina portion of the island, which
had been formed through accretion. Woodward and Butler
claimed title to the disputed portion that extended into South
96. 282 S.C. 366, 318 S.E.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1984).
97. The court of appeals provided the following explanation of the doctrine:
"Where land which was riparian at the time of the original survey is lost by
erosion so that nonriparian land becomes riparian, and land is thereafter built
by accretion to the land which was originally nonriparian, extending over the
location formerly occupied by the original riparian land, the owner of the land
which was originally nonriparian has title only to the accreted land within the
boundaries of the formerly nonriparian tract; and all other land so accreted,
extending over the area formerly occupied by the land of the original riparian
owner, becomes the property of the owner of the original riparian land." Quot-
ing Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965).
Id. at 371, 318 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Greenman v. Smith, 138 N.W.2d 433, 436 (N.D.
1965)).
98. 55 Conn. 292, 10 A. 565 (1887).
99. Id. at 293-94, 10 A. 566-67. The Welles court reasoned that once the original
riparian tract has eroded completely, it cannot be rebuilt since "all original lines sub-
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Carolina under a record chain of title dating back to 1903. The
parties stipulated that around 1930 a portion of the island ex-
tended into South Carolina, but from that time until approxi-
mately 1960, the portion that extended into South Carolina had
completely eroded. From 1960 to the present, however, gradual
accretion had added land extending into South Carolina. 00
The court of appeals based its decision on the policies un-
derlying the ancient rules governing accretion and on notions of
fairness to the parties. South Carolina recognizes the basic com-
mon-law rules that "accretions by natural alluvial action to ripa-
rian or littoral lands become the property of the riparian or lit-
toral owner whose lands are added to" and that "lands gradually
encroached upon by water cease to belong to the former riparian
or littoral owner."' 0'1 The bases for these rules are the "impossi-
bility of identifying at any given moment the imperceptible ad-
ditions to or subtractions from the riparian land,"'0 2 and "the
principle of natural justice that one who sustains the burden of
losses imposed by the contiguity of waters shall be entitled to
whatever benefits they bring."'01 3 These rules had been applied
even when the erosions or accretions occurred across a fixed
boundary line. 0 4 The court of appeals noted, however, that from
ancient Roman law to modern common law, courts and commen-
tators have agreed that accretions occurring across a fixed
boundary or the total erosion of a riparian tract presents a spe-
cial situation that calls for exceptional rules. 0 5 The court con-
cluded that the re-emergence doctrine conforms more closely to
ancient authority than does the Welles line of cases.
The re-emergence doctrine also produces a more equitable
100. 282 S.C. at 368-69, 318 S.E.2d at 585-86. The dispute arose when Horry County
exercised its power of eminent domain over the portion of Bird Island extending into
Horry County. Both the appellant, Price, and the respondents, Woodward and Butler,
claimed entitlement to compensation from the county for the taking. Id. at 368, 318
S.E.2d at 585.
101. Id. at 369-70, 318 S.E.2d at 586 (citing State v. Beach Co., 271 S.C. 425, 248
S.E.2d 115 (1978); Spigener v. Cooner, 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 301 (1855)).
102. 282 S.C. at 369-370, 318 S.E.2d at 586.
103. Id. at 370, 318 S.E.2d at 586 (citing Ocean City Assn. v. Shriver, 64 N.J.L. 550,
46 A. 690, (1900)); J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS 69
(1826).
104. Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, 10 A. 565 (1887). See Annot., 8 A.L.R. 640
(1920); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 395 (1926).
105. 282 S.C. at 372-74, 318 S.E.2d at 587-89. The court of appeals cited a number
of ancient authorities in support of the "re-emergence doctrine." Id.
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result in this case. According to the court of appeals: "If Price
were permitted to follow accretions across the original boundary
of his property, he would receive a windfall unrelated to any risk
of loss imposed on him by the law. Conversely, Morse and his
successors in title, having suffered the loss of their land by ero-
sion. . . would be deprived of the reciprocal benefit of accretion
which the law normally grants to a riparian owner. Such a result
is against reason and equity." 10 If the basic common-law rules
were applied to allow the riparian owner the benefit of accre-
tions and the burden of erosion, it would be contrary to the rea-
soning underlying these rules. This interpretation of the com-
mon law would, therefore, produce an unfair result.
Suzanne E. Scarborough
VII. MORTGAGEE'S RIGHT TO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT Is NOT
SUBJECT TO TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION
Justice Bell's opinion in Bartles v. Livingston'0 7 placed a
confusing line of cases into historical context and put to rest the
notion that a court has discretion to grant or deny a deficiency
judgment in a foreclosure proceeding. In Bartles the court of ap-
peals determined that a trial court does not have discretion to
deny a mortgagee's right to a deficiency judgment.
Bartles is an appeal from a trial court's refusal to grant a
deficiency judgment to a mortgagee who purchased the mort-
gaged property at a foreclosure sale. Bartles, the appellant, held
the second of two mortgages on the property. Both mortgagees
commenced foreclosure proceedings and requested a deficiency
judgment. Since the mortgagors filed no answer and made no
appearance in the foreclosure action,108 the court entered a de-
fault judgment ordering the mortgages foreclosed, decreeing the
amount of principal and interest due on each mortgage, and or-
106. 282 S.C. at 375, 318 S.E.2d at 589. Morse was the holder of the original South
Carolina land grant of the South Carolina portion of Bird Island, under which Wood-
ward and Butler claimed title.
107. 282 S.C. 448, 319 S.E.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1984).
108. The mortgagors, residents of North Carolina when the foreclosure action com-
menced, did enter a special appearance to challenge the court's personal jurisdiction.
The trial court, however, held that this issue was not ripe for decision until a deficiency
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dering the property sold. Bartles was the successful bidder at
the sale of the property. 0 9 The proceeds from the sale were suf-
ficient to satisfy the indebtedness on the first mortgage, but not
to satisfy the debt on Bartles' mortgage. Bartles' subsequent pe-
tition for a deficiency judgment was denied by the circuit court,
which held that the granting of a deficiency judgment is at the
discretion of the court.11 °
The court of appeals found that the circuit court's holding
was based on an erroneous interpretation of Perpetual Building
and Loan Association v. Braun.""' The circuit court had con-
cluded that Braun gave the court discretion to deny a mortga-
gee's right to a deficiency judgment; the court of appeals, how-
ever, found that Braun enlarged the court's discretion to grant,
not deny, deficiency judgments. 1 2
In support of its interpretation, the court of appeals fur-
nished a detailed analysis of the historical development of the
mortgagee's right to a deficiency judgment. Cases that discuss a
court's discretion in rendering deficiency judgments address
what the court of appeals termed the "lingering problem created
by the change from common law strict foreclosure to statutory
foreclosure by sale."' 13 A foreclosure of a mortgage at common
law conveyed title to the mortgagee in fee simple. There was no
sale of the property and no deficiency to be enforced by personal
109. A collateral issue in the case arose as a result of Bartles' failure to comply with
his first bid on the property. The property was advertised and sold again at public auc-
tion at which Bartles was again the successful bidder with a bid $10,000 lower than his
first bid. The court of appeals held that the mortgagors were entitled to an offset against
the deficiency for Bartles' failure to comply with his first bid because the foreclosure
decree directed that if the successful bidder failed to comply with his bid within fifteen
days, the mortgaged property would be resold at his risk. Hence, the mortgagors were
entitled to an offset of $10,000, plus any additional expenses resulting from the second
sale. 282 S.C. at 463, 319 S.E.2d at 710.
110. The mortgagors again entered a special appearance to contest personal jurisdic-
tion at the hearing on Bartles' petition for a deficiency judgment. The circuit court found
that it had personal jurisdiction; this finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 282
S.C. at 454, 319 S.E.2d at 710-11.
111. 270 S.C. 338, 242 S.E.2d 407 (1978).
112. Braun held that a deficiency judgment is such an incident of mortgage foreclo-
sure that it may be supported by a general prayer for relief, notwithstanding mortgagee's
failure to demand the deficiency judgment in his foreclosure complaint. Id. at 339, 242
S.E.2d at 407-08.
113. 282 S.C. at 448, 319 S.E.2d at 714. At common law a mortgage was a "convey-
ance of real property, subject to a condition of defeasance upon repayment of the debt
by the due date." Id. at 455, 319 S.E.2d at 711.
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The Act of 1791114 modified the nature of a mortgage; in-
stead of a conveyance of property the mortgage was in effect a
security device."" This change in the nature of the mortgage
precipitated a corresponding change in the procedure to fore-
close. The Act authorized an action at law for judgment on the
debt and granted the court power to order a sale of the property
and satisfaction of the debt from the proceeds (i.e. foreclosure
by sale). This new procedure gave rise to the possibility of a de-
ficiency if the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to cover the
debt secured by the mortgage. Although the Act provided that a
court of law could enter personal judgment for the deficiency af-
ter the sale, until the 1890's mortgagees employed a variety of
methods to collect on their mortgages.
116
Recognizing this confusion in foreclosure proceedings, the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Anderson v. Pilgram'1 held
that a mortgagee may not bring an action in equity and at law
for the same debt. In Parr v. Lindler"5 the court held that a
personal judgment for a deficiency could be entered only after
the sale, thus eliminating the practice of obtaining a personal
judgment as part of the decree of foreclosure. In 1894, however,
a statute was enacted that allowed courts either to grant a per-
sonal judgment in the foreclosure decree or to grant a deficiency
judgment after the sale.119 This historical analysis illustrates
114. 5 S.C. Stat. at Large 170, No. 1496 (1791).
115. "The Act ... provided that. .. 'the mortgagor shall be still deemed owner of
the land, and the mortgagee as owner of the money lent or due, and shall be entitled to
recover satisfaction for the same out of the land . . . .'" 282 S.C. at 456, 319 S.E.2d at
712 (quoting 5 S.C. Stat. at Large 170, No. 1496 § 1 (1791)).
-116. The court in Bartles listed the ways in which a mortgagee could foreclose a
mortgage:
He could foreclose the mortgage in equity, but seek a personal judgment on the
debt in a separate action at law .... Alternatively, he could seek personal
judgment for the full debt and foreclosure of the mortgage in a single decree in
equity . . . . Finally, he could seek foreclosure of the mortgage with leave to
apply for a deficiency judgment after sale. If a deficiency resulted, he went
back to the equity court, which would determine the amount of the deficiency
and enter a deficiency judgment.
282 S.C. at 457-58, 319 S.E.2d at 712-13 (emphasis in original).
117. 30 S.C. 499, 9 S.E. 587 (1889).
118. 40 S.C. 193, 18 S.E. 636 (1893).
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that the case law controversy concerning the court's discretion
to grant deficiency judgments is a legacy from the procedural
problems precipitated by the Act of 1791. The court of appeals,
finding the circuit court's decision inconsistent with both Braun
and White v. Douglas,'" stated that a court may not deny or
reduce a deficiency judgment. The court's discretion is limited to
the time at which the deficiency judgment will be entered. The
court in Bartles specifically held:
Absent grounds to set aside the decree of foreclosure, there is
no discretion to cut off the right to a deficiency after sale
where (1) the complaint in the foreclosure action asks for per-
sonal judgment, (2) the amount of the debt is fixed in the fore-
closure decree, and (3) the sale is insufficient to satisfy the en-
tire debt. At most, the court may, as it did in this case, defer
the granting of personal judgment until a deficiency actually
results from the sale.
12
1
The Bartles court did not address the statutes governing
foreclosures and deficiency judgments, but relied instead on
common law to resolve the case. Although there is no statute
directly addressing the question of whether a court may deny a
deficiency judgment, section 29-3-670 of the South Carolina
Code provides that a deficiency is not to be extinguished "by
reason of the mortgagee or his assigns becoming purchaser at
such sale, whether the mortgage contained a provision to that
effect or not.'1 22 This statute seems to indicate a strong policy of
granting deficiency judgments whenever a deficiency results
from a foreclosure sale. The court in Braun found that section
15-39-760, 23 which dispenses with the usual thirty-day postsale
open bidding period required by section 15-39-720124 when a de-
ficiency judgment is expressly waived, "indicates the legislative
intention to deny a deficiency judgment only when such has
been expressly waived. ' 1" Bartles, therefore, could have been
decided on statutory grounds.
Although no new rule is announced in Bartles, the historical
120. 128 S.C. 469, 123 S.E. 259 (1924).
121. 282 S.C. at 461, 319 S.E.2d at 715.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-670 (1976).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-760 (1976).
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-720 (1976).
125. 270 S.C. at 343, 242 S.E.2d at 409.
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analysis of the evolution of deficiency judgments in South Caro-
lina is, as a practical matter, a useful tool for the practitioner,
providing much insight into this area of law by placing the case
law on deficiency judgments into its historical context.
Suzanne E. Scarborough
VIII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING AMORTIZATION PERIODS
UPHELD
In Collins v. City of Spartanburg,126 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that an amendment to a zoning ordinance
making long-term vehicle storage a nonconforming use and pro-
viding for a five-year amortization period was constitutional. Ad-
dressing for the first time the constitutionality of amortization
periods for nonconforming uses, 127 the court stated that amorti-
zation periods are valid if reasonable 12 and applied a test for
reasonableness under which the public gain derived from elimi-
nation of the nonconforming use is balanced against the private
harm caused to the nonconforming user. In this case the court
found that the public gain of eliminating the detrimental effect
of the nonconforming use on local property values and on the
health, safety, and welfare of the community 29 outweighed any
possible loss for the owners of the nonconforming property.1
3 0
Laura S. Campbell
126. 281 S.C. 212, 314 S.E.2d 332 (1984).
127. In James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955), the South
Carolina Supreme Court struck down a similar ordinance providing for a one-year amor-
tization period. Since the court there found the ordinance itself unconstitutional, it did
not reach the question of the validity of the amortization period.
128. This is the position adopted in most jurisdictions. 281 S.C. at 214, 314 S.E.2d
at 333. See also Annot., 22 A.L.R.3D 1134 (1968).
129. Evidence at trial indicated that the appellants' storage yards were breeding
grounds for vermin and unsightly because of accumulated trash and weeds. 281 S.C. at
214, 314 S.E.2d at 333.
130. The trial court found that enforcement of the ordinance would not impose any
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